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Recent Developments

United States v. Coleman

I

n United States v. Coleman,
158 F.3d 199 (4th Cir.
1998)(en banc), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that a Maryland
conviction for common-law assault
may constitute a violent felony
under the Armed Career Criminal
Act of 1984 ("ACCA"), 18
U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(West Supp.
1998). A Maryland common-law
assault will be considered a violent
felony for purposes of the ACCA
when it has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force and the crime is
punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year.
In 1996, Sidney R. Coleman
("Coleman") was charged with
felony possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. section
922. Coleman pled guilty to this
charge. Pursuant to the ACCA,
the Government sought sentencing
enhancement which requires three
prior violent felony convictions.
The Government asserted that
Coleman had been previously
convicted in Maryland of robbery
with a deadly weapon in 1983,
assault in 1988, and attempted
murder in 1990. The Government
claimed that the three convictions
satisfied the requisite violent
felony conviction element of the
ACCA.
Coleman contended,
however, that the 1988 conviction
for assault did not fall within the
scope of the ACCA because it did
not have as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 80

MARYLAND
CONVICTION FOR
COMMON-LAW
ASSAULT MAY
CONSTITUTE
"VIOLENT

FELONY" UNDER
THE ARMED
CAREER
CRIMINAL ACT
By Natasha Wrae
physical force, and was not
punishable by imprisonment
greater than one year.
The United States District
Court for the District of Maryland
rejected Coleman's contention and
concluded after a review of the
charging documents of the 1988
assault conviction that the offense
was a "violent felony," placing it
within the scope of the ACCA.
Finding that Coleman was an
armed career criminal, the district
court enhanced his sentence to the
mandatory
fifteen
year
imprisonment as required by the
ACCA. Coleman appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit which affirmed.
To begin its analysis, the court
of appeals looked to the language
of the ACCA. Coleman, 158 F.3d
at 201 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. §
924(e)(West Supp. 1998». A
fifteen year minimum sentence is
mandated by the ACCA for
"individuals convicted pursuant to

18 U.S.c.A. § 922(g) who have
'three previous convictions ... for
a violent felony or a serious drug
offense, or both, committed on
occasions different from one
another. ", Id
(quoting
18
U.S.c.A. § 924 (e)(1)(West Supp.
1998». The ACCA defines a
"violent felony," in pertinent part,
as "any crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year . . . that -- (i) has as an
element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force
against the person of another." Id
(quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 924
(e)(2)(B».
The court of appeals then
considered Coleman's contention
that under Maryland law,
common-law assault does not
necessarily have as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against
someone's person. Id The court
recognized that "[a] Maryland
conviction for common-law assault
presents the unusual situation in
which an offense may be
committed in one of two ways-one of which requires the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force and one of which
does not." Id at 202 (citing United
States v. Kirksey, 138 F.3d 120,
125 (4th Cir. 1998». As a result,
the court declined to find that
within the meaning of 18 u.s.c.A.
section 924 (e)(2)(B)(I), a
Maryland common-law assault
constitutes a per se violent felony.
Id
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The court explained that in
determining whether a conviction
constitutes a violent felony, "a
court generally must 'look only to
the fact of conviction and the
statutory definition of the prior
offense.'" Id. at 201 (citing Taylor
v. United States, 495 U.S. 575
(1990)). However, "in a certain
limited number of situations it is
appropriate for a court to look
beyond the fact of conviction and
the elements of the offense in
deciding whether an offense
constitutes a violent felony."
Coleman, 158 F.3d at 202. Where
an offense could be either
committed with or without
physical force, the court explained,
a district court may look to other
evidence. Accordingly, the court
of appeals found the district
court's approach to be proper
when it consulted the charging
papers and "looked beyond the fact
of conviction and the elements of
the offense to determine whether
the particular offense of which
Coleman was convicted was a
violent felony." Id.
As
a
basis
for
its
determination, the court looked to
the language of Maryland Rule 4201(b) which governs charging
documents. Id. at 202-03. In
essence, the Maryland charging
document rule requires a statement
of charges supported by affidavit
setting forth probable cause that
the defendant committed the
offense charged. Id. at 203. The
language in the charging papers
against Coleman asserted that
"Coleman 'did make an assault on
PIO Reedy.'" Id. at 202. Finding

this statement of the formal charge
to be insufficient to make a
determination, the district court
looked to the statement of charges
containing the affidavit setting
forth the probable cause. Id. The
statement of charges "revealed that
Coleman had pointed a handgun in
the direction of the officer." Id. at
203. As a result, the court found
that the district court's reliance on
the charging papers and statement
of charges was sufficient to
establish that Coleman's assault
conviction involved the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against another. Id.
The final contention by
Coleman formed the basis for the
en banc consideration of the appeal
by the court of appeals. Id.
Coleman contended that his
Maryland conviction for commonlaw assault did not fit within the
ACCA because "it [did] not
constitute a 'crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year.'"
Id. (quoting 18
U.S.C.A. § 924 (e)(2)(B)(West
Supp. 1998)). Coleman relied on
the decision in United States v.
Schultheis, 486 F.2d 1331 (4th Cir.
1973) in which the court of
appeals determined that the
seriousness of the crime is
determined by the "actual sentence
imposed." Coleman, 158 F.3d at
203.
Accordingly, Coleman
asserted that since his sentence for
the assault was eighteen months,
with all but six months suspended,
the conviction should fall under
the misdemeanor exception of 18
U.S.C.A.
section
921 (a)(20)(B)which excludes "any

State offense classified by the laws
of the State as a misdemeanor and
punishable by a term of
imprisonment of two years or
less." Id The Government, on the
other hand, argued the more recent
case, United States v. Hassan El, 5
F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 1993),
established "the common-law
offense of assault in Maryland is a
violent felony because it 'clearly is
punishable by more that two years
imprisonment. '" Coleman, 158
F.3d at 203. The court noted that
although the reasoning of the two
opinions conflicted, the results
reached in each did not. Id at 203
n. 5.
Based on the statutory
language of section 921 (a)(20)(B),
the court determined the critical
inquiry to be "whether the offense
was 'punishable' by a term of
imprisonment greater than two
years--not whether the offense
'was punished' by such a term of
imprisonment." !d. at 203-04.
The court therefore concluded that
Coleman's
1988
Maryland
common-law assault conviction fit
within the violent felony definition
of the ACCA. Id. at 204.
In the instant case, the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit delineated the
standard by which Maryland
common-law assault convictions
are to be assessed pursuant to the
Armed Career Criminal Act of
1984. Although classified as a
misdemeanor by the State of
Maryland, whether common-law
assault is a violent felony is based
on the element of use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical
force and the potential length of
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 81
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imprisonment.
Further, to
establish the physical force
element, the court is permitted to
review the charging documents of
the offense and the affidavit
establishing probable cause. This
decision may prove detrimental to
those individuals previously
convicted of what they believed to
be a misdemeanor, but who may
now be facing enhanced penalties
in the federal courts.
Most
importantly,
the
subjective
physical force element permits
judges to impose the mandatory
fifteen year sentence in federal
proceedings. With this decision, a
defendant's constitutional right to
counsel becomes all the more
critical to ensure that any action
taken at trial, specifically plea
bargaining, is entered into
knowingly and intelligently with
of
future
the
possibility
ramifications fully explained.
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